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OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND COMPETITIVE BEHAVIOR 
 
ABSTRACT 
While ownership structure has been recognized as an important determinant of firm 
behavior at the corporate level, its influence on competitive actions has received insufficient 
attention.  To address this gap, we contrast the case of management-controlled and owner-
controlled firms and discuss how the incentives of managers and owners to maximize economic 
returns may vary across these different ownership structures, leading to heterogeneity in firm 
competitive behaviors.  Our empirical analyses indicate that the relationship of entry, exit, and 









Studying heterogeneity in firm competitive behaviors, such as entry, exit, price rivalry and 
other types of competitive actions is a central topic in competitive strategy research.  Recent work 
has prominently recognized that differences in firm characteristics are important determinants of 
variance in competitive actions.  For example, firm founding conditions are important 
determinants of exit rates (Geroski, Mata, and Portugal, 2010) as is the variety of product lines 
offered (Dowell, 2006).  Entry behaviors differ based on firm capabilities (Lee, 2008) and 
resource levels (Kalnins and Chung, 2004).  Pricing behaviors are affected by the age (Simon, 
2005) and the experience level of the firm (McCann and Vroom, 2010).  Firm differences are also 
a central concern in the competitive dynamics literature (e.g., Chen, 1996; Smith, Ferrier, and 
Ndofor, 2001), which investigates how differences in firms’ awareness, motivation, and ability 
affect their propensity to launch and react to competitive actions. 
Despite the progress that has been made in understanding how differences in firm 
characteristics influence competitive behaviors, the prior literature has been relatively silent about 
the potential role of heterogeneity in firm ownership structure, where ownership structure is 
defined as “the relative amounts of ownership claims held by insiders (management) and outsiders 
(investors with no direct role in the management of the firm)” (Jensen and Meckling, 1976: 305).  
This limited attention is troubling given that scholars stretching back to Adam Smith (1776) and 
Berle and Means (1932) have noted that ownership structure can exert a powerful effect on firm 
decisions.  The effect of the split between ownership and control is of central interest to agency 
theory, and a good deal of research in this area highlights the importance of ownership structure in 
a variety of corporate-level firm decisions, such as corporate R&D spending (e.g., Baysinger, 
Kosnik, and Turk, 1991), diversification (e.g., Denis, Denis, and Sarin, 1997; Goranova,  
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Alessandri, Brandes, and Dharwadkar, 2007; Shleifer and Vishny, 1991) and risky investments 
(e.g., Sanders and Hambrick, 2007; Wright, Ferris, Sarin and Awasthi, 1996; Wright, Kroll, Lado, 
and Van Ness, 2002).  Despite the utility of agency theory in illuminating the influence of 
ownership structure on these types of firm decisions, the theory has not been broadly applied to 
examine competitive behaviors.  This paper addresses this important gap in the literature by 
investigating the role of ownership structure in influencing competitive behavior. 
Consistent with the prior literature in competitive strategy, we start from the assumption 
that firms in general attempt to make economically rational decisions that maximize their payoffs 
through their competitive behaviors.  We expect on average that they will be more likely to enter 
when markets are economically attractive; they will be more likely to exit when recent 
performance is poor; and, they will alter their prices as market conditions change.  Agency theory, 
however, suggests that the ownership structure of the firm may moderate these relationships due to 
variance in the objectives of owners and managers across different ownership structures.  Our 
primary research question, then, is whether variance in ownership structure influences competitive 
behaviors.  Specifically, does the relationship of entry, exit, and pricing behaviors to market 
conditions differ across owner-controlled and management-controlled firms?   
While we argue that agency theory provides support for the view that ownership structure 
will moderate these relationships, our review of the literature suggests that the direction of this 
moderating influence is ex ante indeterminate.  Much of the prior agency literature focuses on the 
misalignment of interests between owners and managers in the case of separation of ownership 
and control, leading to a potential failure of management-controlled firms to take advantage of 
profitable opportunities or the propensity to engage in activities that reduce the value of the firm. 
In addition to this perspective, we also highlight the ideas of several seminal agency scholars who  
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consider how the objectives of owner-controlled firms might vary from profit maximization. 
Building on these insights from the agency literature, we argue that ownership structures relates to 
the objectives of both managers and owners, and, therefore, it is not clear whether owner-
controlled or management-controlled firms’ competitive behaviors will be more responsive to 
market conditions.  As such, we elect to offer competing hypotheses and allow our empirical tests 
to address this indeterminacy.    
This study contributes to the literature first by addressing a troublesome gap in the current 
literature on the determinants of competitive behavior.  We recognize and investigate ownership 
structure as a potentially important determinant of competitive behavior.  Our work responds to 
the call of agency theory scholars such as Daily, Dalton, and Rajagopalan (2003: 153) who note, 
“The differing objective functions attendant on various owner categories must be accounted for in 
any examination of the nature of the relationship between ownership structure and firm processes 
and outcomes.”  We find evidence suggesting that the responsiveness of entry, exit, and pricing 
decisions does vary systematically based on ownership structure.  Second, we also extend the 
application of agency theory to a new context.  The explanatory power and appropriate boundaries 
of agency theory continue to be subjects of debate in the management literature (e.g., Amihud and 
Lev, 1999; Denis, Denis, and Sarin, 1999; Lane, Cannella, and Lubatkin, 1998, 1999).  In this 
respect, our approach is similar to recent work by Reuer and Ragozzino (2006) who extend agency 
theory to examine the question of the composition of firms’ alliance portfolios.  While agency 
theory has mainly been applied to corporate-level decisions, its logic should apply to competitive 
level decisions as well.  Finally, our theorizing and empirical analysis further contributes to the 
strategy literature by suggesting that it might be useful to investigate how owner and manager 
interests that depart from profit maximization affect the competitive behavior of firms.  
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The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  We begin by developing a set of baseline 
hypotheses about the relationship between economic signals and entry, exit, and pricing behaviors 
for firms in general.
1  We then offer a brief review of agency theory and its arguments for why 
these relationships might be weaker in management-controlled firms.  Next, we draw from the 
early work of several prominent agency theory scholars and a number of related literature streams 
to explain why these relationships might be weaker in owner-controlled firms.  After describing 
the data set, measurement issues, and estimation details, we review our empirical results.  The 
final sections discuss and conclude. 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
The Baseline Case 
Firm-level competitive actions are a central concern to competitive strategy (e.g., Porter, 
1980; Chen and Miller, 1994; Gimeno, 1999; Smith, Ferrier, and Ndofor, 2001).  Competitive 
behaviors represent actions undertaken by the firm to enhance its relative competitive position, 
and they include, among others, market entry and exit, signaling behaviors, pricing decisions, 
marketing actions, new product introductions, and capacity investments.  We concentrate on three 
types of competitive behaviors that have received significant attention in the literature: entry (e.g., 
McDougall and Robinson, 1990; Baum and Korn, 1996, Kalnins and Chung, 2004), exit (e.g., 
Barnett, 1993; Baum and Korn, 1996; Boeker, Goodstein and Murmann, 1997), and pricing (e.g., 
Evans and Kessides, 1994; Gimeno, 1999; Vroom and Gimeno, 2007).  Prior to discussing these 
specific competitive behaviors, we offer two clarifications. 
First, consistent with the mainstream of competitive strategy literature, we start from the 
assumption that firms attempt to make economically rational decisions that maximize their payoffs 
                                                 
1 These hypotheses are not offered for their theoretical originality but rather to establish a foundation upon which to 
build the arguments regarding the moderating role of ownership structure.  
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through their competitive behaviors.  For example, Porter (1980: 34) describes competitive 
strategy as taking offensive or defensive actions to “yield a superior return on investment for the 
firm.”  Smith, Ferrier, and Ndofor (2001: 315) assume that firms act creatively to “enhance or 
improve profits, competitive advantage, and industry position.”  This baseline assumption implies 
that firms’ competitive behaviors will be responsive to the market conditions under which they 
operate.  We realize that while this responsiveness is expected to hold for firms on average, it may 
not necessarily hold for each individual firm in all cases.  For example, there might be strategic 
reasons, such as multimarket competition, why individual firm behaviors may at times appear to 
be unresponsive to market conditions.  In spite of the potential for such second-order effects, we 
expect that competitive behaviors on average will generally be related to market conditions. 
2 
Second, because the objectives of firm decision makers are typically not measurable, we 
infer those objectives via the actions taken by the firm.  This approach is comparable to revealed 
preference approaches utilized in discrete choice models of consumer behavior.  Similar to 
individuals in the consumer choice literature, firms’ competitive behaviors are assumed to be 
driven by underlying objectives.  Given that these objectives are largely unobservable, one of the 
virtues of this paper is a rich empirical context that allows us to observe a variety of behavioral 
consequences of unobservable objectives. 
We first consider entry.  In the traditional economic perspective, entry is expected to occur 
when incumbent firms are earning above-normal returns.  That is, firms evaluate the attractiveness 
of entering a particular market based on the likelihood of earning abnormal profits.  A firm will 
enter a market when the expected discounted value of future profits exceeds entry costs.  While 
the speed of entry in response to profitable opportunities has been described as “fairly slow”, the 
                                                 
2 Our empirical estimations will also include a number of controls designed to address other strategic motives that 
might influence competitive behaviors.  
6 
 
weight of empirical evidence does indicate an increasing positive relationship between expected 
profitability and entry (Geroski, 1995: 428).  Thus, as a first baseline hypothesis we expect that 
firms will be more likely to enter when market conditions are more attractive.   
Hypothesis 1: The economic attractiveness of a market is positively related to the likelihood of 
entry into that market. 
We also consider the relationship between economic performance and the likelihood of 
exit.  Exit is also a very common part of the empirical landscape of business (Geroski, 1995).  As 
in the case of entry, we expect that firms will evaluate the net present value of continuing in 
business and that these estimates are informed by their recent performance.  They will be more 
likely to exit when prior performance is poor and more likely to continue when performance is 
strong.   
Hypothesis 2: Prior performance is negatively related to exit. 
Finally, we consider prices.  In the economic view of competition within markets, prices 
and quantities sold are outcomes of the interplay of supply and demand.   Holding supply constant, 
as demand increases, firms have the ability to charge higher prices.  As demand conditions weaken, 
prices fall.  We therefore expect that firms’ prices will be related to the economic attractiveness of 
the local market.     
Hypothesis 3: The economic attractiveness of a market is positively related to firm price. 
The Influence of Ownership Structure 
We turn now to our comparison of owner-controlled and management-controlled firms, the 
focus of our paper.  Our interest is in understanding how ownership structure affects the incentives 
and objectives of managers and owners, which in turn affect the competitive behaviors adopted by 
the firm.  We acknowledge that other factors, such as resources and capabilities, might also be  
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correlated with ownership structure, an issue we will return to in more detail later in the discussion 
of our results.  In examining the moderating influence of ownership structure, we have elected to 
present competing hypotheses for two reasons.  First, compelling arguments can be made for both 
directions of the moderating influence as we detail below.  Second, it has been argued that the use 
of competing hypotheses is an under-utilized approach that is particularly appropriate when 
investigating new research questions (Pleggenkuhle-Miles and Peng, 2008), and the approach has 
demonstrated its utility in a variety of strategy applications (e.g., Kochhar and David, 1996; Poppo 
and Zenger, 1998; Goerzen, 2007; Kacperczyk, 2009; Short, McKelvie, Ketchen, and Chandler, 
2009).   
Management-Controlled Firms. Jensen and Meckling (1976) define the agency 
relationship as a contract under which one party (the principal) engages another party (the agent) 
to perform some service on the principal’s behalf.  In the corporate context, owners, who are 
assumed to have a goal of profit maximization for the firm, hire managers to run the daily 
operations of the firm.  In contrast to the profit-maximization desires of the owners, managers are 
assumed to be interested in maximizing their own individual utility rather than firm profitability.  
When managers do not own significant shares in the firm, their wealth does not vary directly with 
company performance as Jensen and Murphy (1990) note.
3  Thus, the ownership structure of the 
modern corporation, namely the separation of ownership and control, results in the divergence of 
interests between owners and managers.  Scholars as early as Smith (1776: 700) have suggested 
that “negligence and profusion, therefore, must always prevail” in management-controlled 
companies because it cannot be expected that those who manage others’ money will watch over it 
with the same “anxious vigilance” as they would watch over their own.  In the absence of 
                                                 
3 When managers are also owners, they are assumed to be more likely to act in shareholders' interests because they 
have similar incentives, the so-called “alignment” view (Dalton, Daily, Certo and Roengpitya, 2003).  
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alignment between ownership and control, managers behave opportunistically and tend to 
appropriate perquisites out of the firm’s resources for their own consumption (see Dalton, Hitt, 
Certo, and Dalton, 2007, among others for an overview).  Berle and Means (1932: 141) summarize 
this view, “Have we any justification for assuming that those in control of the modern corporation 
will also choose to operate it in the interests of the owners?” 
Evidence for the consequences of divergent interests between managers and owners has 
been developed mainly through work examining corporate-level decisions. For example, both 
Amihud and Lev (1981) and Denis, Denis, and Sarin (1997) noted that diversification of the firm 
can be viewed as perquisite consumption by managers because it can reduce employment risk and 
lead to larger salaries.  These studies found that firms with lower levels of overlap between 
management and ownership tended to engage in more diversification.  Similarly, Kroll, Wright, 
Toombs, and Leavell (1997) examined returns from acquisitions in management-controlled firms 
over the 1982–1991 time period and noted that acquisition announcements generated negative 
returns for stockholders of these firms. Chen and Steiner (1999) explored the relationship between 
the lack of managerial ownership and firm risk in a sample of large firms listed on the New York 
Stock Exchange, finding that management-controlled firms (low levels of overlap between 
management and ownership) are less willing to undertake risk.   
In sum, agency theory predicts that as the amount of ownership by managers decreases, the 
lower the likelihood that the firm will be operated in congruence with the profit-seeking objectives 
of the external owners.  Rather than being purely motivated by maximizing firm profitability, 
entry and exit decisions may be influenced by personal objectives such as the desire to increase the 
size of the firm to reduce employment risk and grow pay and influence.  Moreover, given market 
uncertainty, the limits on the span of attention of managers (Simon, 1947; Ocasio, 1997), and the  
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costs associated with monitoring market signals and responding appropriately, the pricing 
decisions of utility-motivated managers will also be less responsive to market signals.  Overall, 
this perspective would anticipate that the association between market conditions and entry, exit, 
and pricing behaviors of the firm would be weaker for management-controlled firms when 
compared to owner-controlled firms.   
Hypothesis 1a: The positive relationship between the economic attractiveness of a market and 
likelihood of entry will be weaker for management-controlled establishments than for 
owner-controlled establishments. 
Hypothesis 2a: The negative relationship between prior performance and likelihood of exit 
will be weaker for management-controlled establishments than for owner-controlled 
establishments. 
Hypothesis 3a: The positive relationship between the economic attractiveness of a market and 
firm prices will be weaker for management-controlled establishments than for owner-
controlled establishments. 
Much of prior agency theory work concentrates on difference in managerial objectives 
across different ownership structures.  As shown in Figure 1, the role of ownership structure in 
influencing firm behavior flows through differences in managerial incentives, which result in 
differences in objectives at the firm level.  What has garnered less attention in the recent agency 
theory literature, however, is the lower pathway of Figure 1.  Variance in ownership structure 
might also be associated with differences in the nature of owner objectives, leading to differences 
in firm behavior.  As we discuss in detail below, the consideration of owner objectives in owner-
controlled firms suggests that the relationship between market conditions and competitive 
behaviors might be stronger for management-controlled firms relative to owner-controlled firms.  
10 
 
------------------------- Insert Figure 1 about here------------------------ 
Owner-Controlled Firms.  The owner-controlled firm, by definition, has no agency 
problems; however, the lack of agency problems does not necessarily imply that the firm will be a 
pure profit-seeking entity.  Prior literature provides ample support for the assertion that owner-
managers may not have pure profit-maximizing objectives.  Several seminal agency thinkers 
clearly adopted this perspective.  For example, Jensen and Meckling (1976: 312) note that an 
owner-manager’s interests involve “not only the benefits he derives from pecuniary returns but 
also the utility generated by various non-pecuniary aspects of his entrepreneurial activities.”   
These dual objectives exist because owner-managers may utilize the firm for both consumption 
and production.  Owner-managers will consume within the firm when the consumption 
possibilities offered there are not available elsewhere (e.g., utility gained from work autonomy or 
leading an organization) or when the cost of the utility received is lower than if consumption took 
place in the household (e.g., if tax policy allows certain expenses to be deducted from business but 
not personal income).  Firms can provide their owner-managers with “nonpecuniary income 
associated with the provision of general leadership and with the ability to deploy resources to suit 
one’s personal preferences” (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985: 1161-1162).  Thus, Demsetz (1983: 382-
383) observed, “It is clearly an error to suppose that a firm managed by its only owner comes 
closest to the profit-maximizing firm postulated in the model firm of economic theory.” 
The idea that managers of firms with high levels of inside ownership may be motivated by 
more than just economic returns is supported by a number of related literature streams.  Given the 
high degree of owner management in start-up firms, the entrepreneurship literature is a stream of 
research that should be particularly relevant to the issue of the goals of owner-managers.  Much of 
the empirical evidence regarding the choice to engage in entrepreneurial activities reflects the  
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importance of nonpecuniary motives.  First, studies of both prospective and current business 
owners indicate that businesses are considered (Amit, MacCrimmon, and Zietsma, 2001; 
Gatewood, Shaver, and Gartner, 1995; Sine and Lee, 2009) and sustained (Gimeno, Folta, Cooper, 
and Woo, 1997) for both financial and non-financial reasons.  Second, comparisons of self-
employed and organizationally employed individuals also support the non-financial rewards of 
working for oneself (Benz and Frey, 2008; Hundley, 2001).  These findings are consistent with 
earlier work by Aronson (1991) and Hamilton (2000) indicating that the majority of self-employed 
workers in the United States do not switch to paid employment despite greater income-earning 
opportunities there.  Finally, studies of the economic returns to entrepreneurial activities beyond 
just self-employment generally indicate that the economic returns are insufficient to adequately 
compensate owners, leading to a suggestion that nonpecuniary returns make up the difference (e.g., 
Hamilton, 2000; Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen 2002). 
The family business literature also supports the importance of non-financial motivations to 
inside owners.  Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, and Buchholtz (2001), for example, argue that altruistic 
tendencies guide many of the decisions within family-run firms.  Gomez-Mejia, Haynes, Nunez-
Nickel, Jacobsen, and Moyano-Fuents (2007: 106) similarly argue that family firms’ motivations 
include a desire to attain socioemotional wealth, or “non-financial aspects of the firm that meet the 
family’s affective needs, such as identity, the ability to exercise family influence, and the 
perpetuation of the family dynasty.” 
In summary, owner-managers, who wish to maximize their own utility, may take actions 
that are inconsistent with profit maximization if those actions serve to increase their individual 
utility.  For example, owner-controlled firms’ entry decisions may be less attentive to market 
signals if those entry decisions generate psychic enjoyment from opening a business near friends  
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and family (Dahl and Sorenson, 2009), in the owner-manager’s hometown, or in a particularly 
physically attractive location.  Similarly, their exit decisions may be less responsive to 
performance indicators because of potential non-financial costs such as loss of reputation or 
imposing unemployment on family or friends.  The importance of such psychic income is 
consistent with the work of Gimeno, Folta, Cooper, and Woo (1997) who found a negative 
association between psychic income and propensity to exit in a sample of small business owners.  
Finally, owner-managers’ interest in the psychic income aspects of business will restrict the 
amount of their limited attention span that is devoted to monitoring market signals and responding 
with changes in pricing practices. 
It is not that these owner-managers do not operate the firm in the “interests of owners” as 
concerned Berle and Means (1932).  Rather, it is that the interests of inside owners are not 
restricted simply to profits.  Thus, in the case of the owner-controlled firm, both the owner and 
manager (who is the same person) will have an objective to maximize utility, which may include 
both financial and non-financial components.  Because we are aware of no ex ante reason to rule 
out the possibility that this tension between pecuniary and non-pecuniary objectives in owner-
controlled firms outweighs the tension between owner profit and manager utility objectives in 
management-controlled firms, we offer the following competing hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1b: The positive relationship between the economic attractiveness of a market and 
likelihood of entry will be weaker for owner-controlled establishments than for 
management-controlled establishments. 
Hypothesis 2b: The negative relationship between prior performance and likelihood of exit 




Hypothesis 3b: The positive relationship between the economic attractiveness of a market and 




Investigation of our research questions requires an empirical setting that includes 
observation of the exit, entry, and pricing behavior of both owner-controlled and management-
controlled firms along with measures of market attractiveness.  The hotel industry provides a 
particularly appropriate setting because it consists of a wide range of firms from owner-controlled 
hotels to individual units of management-controlled corporations.  Local competition characterizes 
this industry, as hotels compete with others in the same geographic area but not with hotels in 
other parts of the state or country (Baum and Mezias, 1992).  We draw our sample from the hotel 
industry in the state of Texas over 34 quarters covering the years 1997 through mid-2005.  A mix 
of independent and chain hotels comprised the sample; the hotel chains operate branded units both 
through franchise relationships and by company ownership of individual units.  
Two primary sources provided the data for our analyses.  The first is a publicly available 
tax file from the State of Texas Comptroller’s Office, which provides quarterly reporting of the 
state’s Hotel Occupancy Tax along with the hotel name, hotel location, owner name/address, hotel 
capacity, and quarterly revenues. The second data source is a private database from Source 
Strategy, Inc., a leading hotel consultant that maintains data on Texas hotels from 1976 through 
the present.  This database included the same hotels and also reports quarterly.  In addition to the 
hotel name, their data also included the average quarterly occupancy rate, price, and revenue per  
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available room for each hotel.
4  The first database has been used among others by Chung and 
Kalnins (2001) and Vroom and Gimeno (2007) while the second database has been used in 
previous studies such as Conlin and Kadiyali (2006) and Vroom and Gimeno (2007).  To focus on 
hotels and motels as opposed to other types of lodging options that are included in the data set 
(such as bed and breakfasts and recreational vehicle parks), independent hotels with average room 
capacities under ten were dropped from the data set.   
  We utilized the zip code as the definition of the boundaries of an establishment’s local 
market.  Although some of the prior literature has used broader county/city-level definitions (e.g., 
Conlin and Kadiyali, 2006), we believe that narrowing to the zip code level better approximates 
the choice set consumers review when selecting a hotel.  This market definition is consistent with 
previous studies of the Texas hotel industry (Chung and Kalnins, 2001; Kalnins and Chung, 2004; 
Vroom and Gimeno, 2007; McCann and Vroom, 2010).  During the eight and one-half years 
included in the data, over 4,000 hotels operated across more than 850 local Texas markets, and the 
number of hotels grew by 3.3 percent annually.   
Dependent Variables and Modeling Approach 
  Each of our hypotheses required a different dependent variable and modeling approach as 
described in more detail below. 
Entry.  We utilized conditional logit to investigate differences in the entry behavior of 
owner-controlled and management-controlled establishments (McFadden, 1974).   Conditional 
logit is suitable for location choice decisions among a large set of geographic options (e.g., Head, 
Ries, and Swenson, 1995; Shaver and Flyer, 2000; Kalnins and Chung, 2004), and it is appropriate 
for modeling how a broad set of covariates influences the choice of a particular location from a 
                                                 
4 The average room price (average daily rate or ADR), the occupancy rate, and the average revenue per available room 
(RevPAR) are the three most commonly used performance indicators in the hotel industry. The relationship between 
these three measures is as follows: revenue per available room = occupancy rate * average room price.  
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number of alternatives.  We derived our dependent variable of interest, entry, from a focal hotel’s 
first appearance in the database, and we considered a variety of choice sets.   
Exit.  Our dependent variable for the exit models was a binary dependent variable coded “1” 
if the hotel exited during a particular quarter and “0” otherwise.  To avoid potential bias that might 
result from censored cases, we analyzed the hazard of exit using both semiparametric and 
parametric survival models with time-varying covariates.  To accommodate time variation in the 
covariates, we divided the data into quarterly spells, resulting in 105,037 establishment-quarter 
observations in the total sample.   
Pricing. The dependent variable in these analyses was the logged average daily price of an 
individual hotel room.  To control for potential unobserved sources of heterogeneity that might 
impact prices, we utilized hotel-level fixed effects regression to model prices.  The sample 
includes 108,153 establishment-quarter observations.
5 
Independent and Control Variables 
Our measure of ownership structure is a dummy variable indicating whether a hotel was 
owner-controlled or management-controlled.  In the hotel industry, individual establishments are 
either independent or affiliated with a particular chain.  Chain-affiliated establishments may be 
owned by the chain (company-owned) or by franchisees.  We defined all company-owned units to 
be management-controlled.
6  To determine the ownership type of franchised and independent units, 
we defined a hotel to be owner-controlled if its owner’s zip code as reported in the State of Texas 
records was the same as the zip code of the hotel.  Typically owners who also manage their hotel 
                                                 
5 The exit sample is slightly smaller than the pricing sample due to deletion of observations with missing data on prior 
firm occupancy. 
6 Some hotel chains (e.g., Hyatt Hotels) feature partial separation of ownership and control in that some members of 
the founding family maintain ownership and managerial positions.  Owners also include family members with no 
managerial roles and outside investors.  We elected to include this type of chain in the management-controlled 
category for two reasons.  First, our theoretical development regarding owner-controlled firms concentrates on the 
case of full overlap between management and control.  Second, these chains include professional management 
throughout the organization in addition to the family managers who maintain ownership positions.    
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live relatively close to their establishment.  Living nearby (e.g., in the same zip code) allows the 
owner to closely monitor and supervise their property, even if they have professional staff 
assisting them in the management of the hotel.  In contrast, close supervision would not be 
feasible when living farther away and would require the use of control and decision-making 
systems similar to those of management-controlled organizations.  Of the 3,289 hotels operating at 
the mid-point of the data set, 1,799 (55 percent) were owner-controlled and 1,490 (45 percent) 
were management-controlled.  We also considered an alternative definition in which we defined 
hotels to be owner-controlled if the hotel owner lived within the state and owned no more than a 
single hotel.  This broader definition of owner-management resulted in 2,240 hotels (68 percent) 
being classified as owner-controlled. 
Entry models. Our measure of the attractiveness of a particular market is the average 
occupancy rate (the percentage of occupied rooms) across all hotels in a particular zip code.  Mean 
occupancy rates reflect the strength of local market demand conditions.  When demand is high 
relative to supply, market occupancy, market prices, and market profitability all tend to increase, 
suggesting that mean occupancy is a good indicator for the economic attractiveness of the market. 
To control for differences in access to resources and capabilities across owner-controlled 
and management-controlled establishments, we calculated the total capacity (number of rooms) 
owned by each owner across all of its establishments.  We expect that establishments that are part 
of larger organizations may have access to greater financial resources and that larger organizations 
are more willing and able to invest in the development and transfer of managerial capabilities 
throughout the organization.  We also controlled for other factors that may impact entry to markets, 
including a measure of market concentration, calculated as the sum of the squared market shares 
of all hotels in the zip code, and the logarithm of market capacity (the total number of rooms of all  
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hotels in the zip code) to control for variations in supply conditions.  Market mean occupancy and 
the other time variant market-level controls were lagged four periods (one year) to reflect the fact 
that entry decisions are made well in advance of the actual observation of the opening of the hotel.  
We also controlled for whether other hotels of the same chain are located within the market 
because brands often avoid locating multiple hotels in the same market.  We also measured the 
degree of multimarket contact available to the entrant in each potential market, as the multi-market 
literature (e.g., Gimeno, 1999) suggests that rival firms may seek out contact across multiple 
markets to establish mutual forbearance.
7 
Other market-level controls include a dummy variable indicating whether the market was 
in a rural location and measures of the level of economic activity within the zip code, drawn from 
the 2002 Zip Code Business Patterns available from the U.S. Census Bureau (number of retail and 
gas establishments in the zip code).  We also controlled for the income level, population, and 
number of housing units within the zip code using data drawn from the 2000 U.S. Census.  The 
Census measures were all log-transformed. 
Exit models. To capture responsiveness to recent performance, our primary independent 
variable is the establishment’s occupancy level in the prior quarter.  The exit models also include 
the same set of control variables as the entry models, although the market-level measures were 
lagged one period instead of four due to the fact that exit decisions are likely made more closely in 
time to the observation of exit in the data set.  In addition, we added firm-level controls of the 
segment in which the hotels operated to capture any differences in exit behavior across hotels of 
different size and quality.  We utilized the Smith Travel Research (STR) Chain Scales to classify 
                                                 
7 We also considered the inclusion of a measure of distance to the owner’s headquarters as owners may prefer to 
locate new establishments closer to headquarters to facilitate monitoring (Kalnins and Lafontaine, 2004).  We elected 
not to include this measure in the reported results because of the preponderance of single-owner entries in our data for 
whom distance to headquarters for the first hotel is not a meaningful measure.  In unreported models, however, the 
variable had the expected negative significant effect and our substantive results did not change.    
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hotels into four segments (Economy, Midscale, Upscale, and Luxury).  Independent hotels (not 
chain-affiliated) were classified into these segments based on their average room price over the 
life of the data set.    
Pricing models. In addition to hotel-level fixed establishment effects that control for 
unobserved sources of heterogeneity, these regressions included fixed segment and period effects.  
Market-level controls included market capacity and concentration as described above. These 
measures were lagged one period as was the measure of market occupancy.  We also included 
controls for whether the hotel was a franchised or company-owned unit (with independent being 
the excluded category).
8   
RESULTS 
We begin with some descriptive statistics comparing management-controlled and owner-
controlled establishments.  In general, Table 1 indicates that the management-controlled hotels 
tend to be larger, and they also exhibit higher occupancy levels, prices, and quality levels.  Their 
owners tend to own a number of additional hotels as well; on average, a management-controlled 
establishment shares common ownership with 15 other establishments.  Finally, they exhibit a mix 
of ownership forms, including company-owned, franchised, and independent units.  The owner-
controlled establishments are a mix of both franchised and independent units, and the average 
number of establishments owned is slightly larger than one.  At the market level, management-
controlled units tend to be located in stronger markets; their markets have higher capacity, 
occupancy, prices, and quality levels, but slightly lower concentration.  The average population, 
income, and number of competing establishments are also higher.   
------------------------- Insert Table 1 about here------------------------ 
                                                 
8 We excluded any time-invariant measures from the fixed effects regressions because these time-invariant effects are 
captured by the fixed establishment effects.  Segment and franchise / company-owned controls are included because 
some hotels switch segments and ownership structure over the course of the data set.  
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We next review some descriptive statistics related to our choice of mean market occupancy 
and prior firm occupancy as measures of economic attractiveness.  First, we compared prices and 
entry activity across markets above and below the median market occupancy level.  The average 
daily price of a hotel room in more attractive markets ($59.25) is over 19 percent higher than the 
average price in less attractive markets ($49.52), and attractive markets draw nearly twice as many 
entrants (685 vs. 396).  These descriptive statistics support mean market occupancy as an indicator 
of market attractiveness, and the results are consistent with our expectations of the direct effects of 
this measure. Second, a comparison of average prior firm occupancy rates for firms who exited 
(40.05%) versus those who survived (54.4%) also supports the choice of firm occupancy for the 
exit regressions. 
Entry 
  Table 2 presents the results of the conditional logit entry analyses.  We provide the results 
from choice sets of the nearest 250 and 200 markets; the results, however, are robust to a variety 
of choice sets, including ones as small as the nearest ten markets and on choice sets based on a 
variety of radial distances (10, 20, and 50 miles). We also confirmed that a Hausman test fails to 
reject the conditional logit model’s assumption of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives 
(p=0.19).  The positive coefficient on Market Occupancy in Model 1 supports Hypothesis 1, the 
baseline prediction that entry behaviors are influenced by signals of market attractiveness.  Firms 
are more likely to enter markets with higher levels of occupancy.  Specifically, the coefficient of 
0.020 indicates that a one percentage point increase in market occupancy is associated with a two 
percent increase in the odds that a market will be chosen for entry.     
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We now turn to the potential moderating influence of ownership structure.  Model 2 
introduces the interaction of Owner-Controlled * Market Occupancy.
9  The negative interaction 
effect supports Hypothesis 1b and its prediction that the positive relationship between market 
occupancy and probability of entry would be weaker for owner-controlled firms, and does not 
support Hypothesis 1a.  Panel A of Figure 2 presents this result graphically, showing that increases 
in market occupancy levels have a more positive relationship to log odds of entry for 
management-controlled firms.  To ensure that this relationship was not merely proxying for a 
difference in the relationship across firms of different resource levels, Model 3 introduces an 
interaction with the owner capacity variable.  The coefficient on this variable is positive, but not 
significant.  While the Owner-Controlled * Market Occupancy interaction is slightly reduced, it 
remains negative and significant.  The results are quite similar in Models 4 – 6, which are based 
on the smaller choice set.  Overall, the models support a conclusion that the relationship between 
entry behaviors and market attractiveness is weaker for owner-controlled firms. 
These results were robust to a number of alternative specifications, including our 
alternative definition of owner-manager.  We also investigated different lags of market occupancy, 
including an average going back an additional year.  In addition, we examined models that defined 
markets based on segments within zip codes.  In these models, we replaced the market occupancy, 
concentration, and capacity measures (aggregated at the zip code level) with measures aggregated 
at the segment level of the entrant (Economy, Midscale, Upscale, or Luxury) within each zip code.  
The substantive results of the analysis were robust to all of these alternative specifications and 
provided broad support for Hypothesis 1b.  Overall, the relationship between market attractiveness 
and entry is stronger for management-controlled firms. 
                                                 
9 We do not include the main effect of Owner-Controlled in the specification.  The effect is inestimable in the 
conditional logit model because the variable does not vary within choices.  
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------------------------- Insert Table 2 about here------------------------ 
------------------------- Insert Figure 2 about here------------------------ 
Exit 
  Table 3 provides the results of our exit analyses, which include both Cox proportional 
hazards (semiparametric) and Weibull (parametric) survival models.  Because we have multiple 
observations per zip code, the models utilized robust standard errors, clustered to adjust for 
intrazip correlation.  The negative coefficient on Prior Unit Occupancy in Model 7 supports our 
baseline prediction (Hypothesis 2) that the hazard of exit decreases at higher levels of 
establishment occupancy.  The coefficient of -0.062 indicates that a one percentage point increase 
in firm occupancy is associated with a six percent decrease in the hazard of exit.
10  The effect is 
quite similar in the Weibull model results (Model 10). 
Models 8 and 11 add the interaction of Owner-Controlled * Prior Unit Occupancy.  The 
significant positive interactions imply that the negative main effect of prior unit occupancy is 
weaker (less negative) for owner-controlled establishments, supporting Hypothesis 2b and not 
Hypothesis 2a.  The difference in the relationships between prior unit occupancy and likelihood of 
exit is shown in Panel B of Figure 2.  While both types of firms are more likely to exit as unit 
occupancy decreases, this relationship is weaker for the owner-controlled establishments.  The 
result is unchanged even controlling for the interaction with the resource level of the owner (total 
capacity) as shown in Models 9 and 12.   
Our exit results were robust to our alternative definition of owner-manager and to a variety 
of alternative specifications.  We examined binary logit, random effects logit, and complementary 
log-log models of the exit decision, all of which produced similar results.  The results were also 
                                                 
10 The baseline hazard is multiplicatively increased by exp(-0.062) or 0.94 , which represents an approximate six 
percent decrease.  
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similar using a measure of average firm occupancy over the prior four quarters as well as using a 
market occupancy measure (average occupancy level in the zip code) rather than a firm-level 
measure.   
------------------------- Insert Tables 3 and 4 about here------------------------ 
Pricing 
  Table 4 presents the results of our analysis for the pricing behavior of hotels using a fixed 
effects regression specification with robust standard errors, clustered to adjust for intrafirm 
correlation. Results of a Hausman test indicated that the fixed effects specification was preferred 
to a random effects specification, although the substantive results were unchanged across the 
specifications.  The positive coefficient on Market Occupancy in Model 13 indicates that hotels in 
markets with higher prior quarter occupancy levels have higher prices as predicted by Hypothesis 
3.  The coefficient of 0.0021 in Model 13 indicates that a one standard deviation increase in 
Market Occupancy (11.41 percentage points) is associated with prices that are 2.39% higher.  The 
significant negative coefficient of -0.0007 on the interaction of Owner-Controlled * Market 
Occupancy in Model 14 indicates that the positive main effect is weaker for owner-controlled 
establishments, consistent with the prediction of Hypothesis 3b.  The Model 14 results indicate 
that the prices of management-controlled firms are 2.89% higher when market occupancy levels 
increase one standard deviation while the prices of owner-controlled firms are 2.07% higher.  This 
difference of 0.82% has a meaningful economic impact.  For the average hotel in our data set with 
a capacity of 91 rooms and an occupancy level of 55 percent, increasing price 0.82% above its 
average level translates into an annual revenue increase of just under $10,000.   While both owner-
controlled and management-controlled establishments price higher when demand conditions are 
more favorable, this relationship is stronger for the management-controlled establishments.  These  
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results were robust to the alternative definition of owner-manager as well as to the use of segment-
based market measures. 
DISCUSSION 
A wealth of research has investigated the link between ownership structure and corporate 
behaviors as well as the link between ownership structure and performance generally (e.g., 
Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000; Durand and Vargas, 2003; also see Dalton, Daily, Certo, and 
Roengpitya, 2003 for a summary and meta-analysis).  As a complement to these literature streams, 
we set out with the purpose of testing whether and how the ownership structure of the firm affects 
competitive behaviors.  Specifically, we investigated whether the relationship of entry, exit, and 
pricing behaviors to market conditions differed across owner-controlled and management-
controlled firms.  We reviewed theoretical arguments supporting the potential moderating 
influence of ownership structure while noting the ex ante indeterminacy in the direction of the 
moderating influence.  Recent agency theory work led to a prediction that the relationships would 
be weaker for management-controlled firms because of the incentive conflict between profit-
seeking owners and utility-seeking managers.  In contrast, insights drawn from several early 
agency scholars and from work examining the motives of entrepreneurs and family business 
predicted that the baseline relationships could be weaker for owner-controlled firms who use their 
businesses to pursue both economic and non-economic returns.  Our empirical analyses indicated 
that the entry, exit, and pricing decisions of owner-controlled establishments are less responsive to 
economic conditions relative to the decisions of management-controlled establishments.   
Our aim in this paper was not to gather evidence to conclude that one of these perspectives 
was “more correct” than the other.  Moreover, we do not interpret our results to be in conflict with 
predictions based on principal-agent problems.  Our perspective is that both types of distortions  
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away from the ideal of profit maximization likely play a role in firms.  In our context, however, 
the distortion in owner-controlled firms appears to outweigh the distortion in management-
controlled firms.   
The stronger owner-managed distortion may be associated with unique aspects of our 
empirical context.  The availability of franchising, the limiting of competition to local areas, the 
relatively low requirements for specialized skills, and the critical importance of location (relative 
to individual skills) in the hotel industry may all combine to create an environment more 
conducive to owner-managers who are less profit-focused.  More generally, we believe that more 
munificent environments, industries that are more likely to offer non-pecuniary returns, and 
industries with low entry barriers might result in a higher level of owner-managed firms that place 
less emphasis on maximizing profits.   
For management-controlled firms, we have assumed that firm owners are interested in 
profit maximization.  This assumption flowed from the fact that diffuse, external owners have no 
ability to extract utility directly from the operations of the firm.  The only source of utility 
available to them is the stream of monetary rewards flowing from the firm.  Whether firm 
behavior actually reflects this owner goal will likely relate to whether opportunities exist for 
managers to appropriate value and how agency issues are controlled.  We note that a variety of 
mechanisms are available to reduce agency conflicts, and the growth and prominence of literature 
concerned with agency problems has led firms to increase their efforts to address these problems.  
First, Fama and Jensen (1983: 331) note that decision making control can be separated from the 
locus of utility benefits by separating decision management (initiation and implementation) and 
control (ratification and monitoring).  In the case of hierarchical organization, decision making 
rights can be assigned to managers other than those who would directly gain from particular  
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decisions.  For example, if local managers of a geographically diverse organization potentially 
gain non-pecuniary benefits from certain decisions made at the local level, those decision rights 
can be assigned to regional or corporate level managers who do not benefit from the local non-
pecuniary benefits.  Second, incentive pay, use of which is becoming more widespread (Byrd, 
Parrino and Pritsch, 1998; World at Work, 2008), can be used to align the goals of managers 
toward profit maximization.  Firms who use lower levels of incentive pay can compensate with 
other agency controls, such as higher monitoring (Beatty and Zajac, 1994).  Third, a host of other 
non-monetary incentives exist that encourage profit-seeking behavior on the part of managers such 
as the desire to avoid punishment, the quest to advance in intra-company “promotion tournaments” 
(Lazear and Rosen, 1981), and the need to establish a good reputation in the managerial labor 
market (Gibbons and Murphy, 1992).  To the extent that effective measures are in place to align 
interests of owners and managers, management-controlled firms are more likely to portray a strong 
relationship between market conditions and their competitive behavior, compared to owner-
controlled firms. 
We invite more research into the relative strength of these distortions away from profit 
maximizing behavior in other empirical contexts.  As a first step, our research indicates that 
ownership structure is an important source of firm heterogeneity that contributes to differences in 
competitive behavior. Our comparison of owner-controlled to management-controlled firms is 
particularly important given the significant role played by firms in which ownership and control 
are unlikely to be fully separated.  The U.S. Census Bureau estimates that there are over 22 million 
private businesses in the U.S., accounting for 40 to 60 percent of GDP (Scott Morton and Podolny, 
2002).  Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgenson (2002) estimate that individuals’ investments in private 
business equal $5.7 trillion, only slightly trailing investments in public equity of $7.3 trillion.  
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Our work shows that agency theory offers a potentially fruitful addition to the study of 
competitive behavior.  While this study will obviously not resolve the debate about the 
explanatory power and suitable boundaries of agency theory, our results do suggest that concepts 
drawn from agency theory are useful tools in the investigation of competitive actions.  A 
promising extension of our work would be to examine how other concepts drawn from agency 
theory, such as incentive pay, board structure, and the like, might also be integrated into the 
competitive strategy literature.
11   
Finally, our research suggests that it might be useful to consider how investigating 
distortions away from profit maximization might advance our understanding of firms’ competitive 
behaviors.  Whether firms maximize profits in reality has been the subject of recurring debate, and 
scholars have offered a variety of objections to the profit maximization assumption.  These 
objections have highlighted ability limitations (e.g., Simon, 1947), organizational obstacles (e.g., 
Cyert and March, 1963), agency issues (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976), and alternative non-
monetary objectives (e.g., Machlup, 1967) among other reasons why firms may not engage in 
profit maximizing behaviors.  Although the profit maximization assumption has been attacked 
from a number of directions, it has also been prominently defended, most notably by Friedman 
(1953) who offered one of the more well-known defenses of the profit-maximization assumption.  
He argued that firms that did not engage in profit-maximizing behaviors would eventually be 
selected out of the environment and suggested that this justified the assumption of firms’ behaving 
as if they were seeking rationally to maximize expected returns.  Alchian (1950) similarly argued 
                                                 
11 A stream of research in economics referred to as strategic delegation theory touches upon some of these issues.  For 
example, Vickers (1985) argued that managers given an incentive to profit maximize might actually end up generating 
lower profits than managers without this incentive.  See Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987) for a formal 
treatment of strategic delegation using game theoretic models.  
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that profit maximization is not a result of firm decisions but rather a result of an evolutionary 
process being conducted at an industry-wide level.   
While the above literature has debated whether firms in general reach the theoretical ideal 
of profit maximization, our purpose is to suggest that there is value in considering that different 
types of firms more closely approach this theoretical ideal than do other firms.  Furthermore, the 
extent to which firms approach the ideal will have predictable effects on the competitive behaviors 
they adopt.  We believe that investigating the effects of varying objectives on competitive actions 
offers a promising area of future research because the competitive strategy literature from both the 
industrial organization perspective (e.g., Porter, 1980) and the competitive dynamics approach 
(e.g., Smith, Ferrier, and Ndofor, 2001) has largely adopted the profit maximization assumption 
despite the voluminous debate that has featured serious objections to this assumption.  Overall, the 
strategy literature in general might find it useful to more fully investigate variance in objectives to 
further the quest to understand performance heterogeneity across firms.   
Our findings provide some interesting links to other literature streams.  A recent series of 
papers (Lubatkin, Schulze, Ling, and Dino, 2005; Schulze et al., 2001; Schulze, Lubatkin, and 
Dino, 2002) have questioned how well family firms approximate the theoretical profit-maximizing 
entity devoid of agency problems.  Family firms typically feature partial separation of ownership 
and control; while a number of the family owners are actively involved in management of the firm, 
other family members are passive owners who take no part in management.  This stream of 
research has argued that this partial separation results in agency problems that may lead to 
managerial behaviors inconsistent with profit-maximization objectives.  Investigating how this 
partial separation of ownership and control affects the competitive behaviors of family firms is an 
interesting area for future research.  
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Our findings also relate to research in the competitive dynamics literature.  This research 
stream investigates competitive interactions among firms and posits three implicit drivers of 
competitive action or response – a firm’s awareness of a competitive relationship and/or 
competitors’ initiatives, its motivation or incentive to act or respond, and its capability to act or 
respond (Chen, 1996; Chen, Su, and Tsai, 2007; Smith, Ferrier, and Ndofor, 2001).   Our work 
relates strongly to the motivation driver with our argument that ownership structure influences the 
incentives of firm decision makers.  A promising extension of this work would be to more fully 
integrate it with the competitive dynamics literature to examine whether ownership structure 
affects other factors studied closely in this research stream such as the propensity to initiate and/or 
respond to competitive actions and the speed at which moves are made.   
  Although our focus in this paper has been on the comparison of competitive behaviors of 
owner-controlled and management-controlled firms, an interesting extension of this work would 
be to examine how the presence of owner-controlled establishments affects the competitive 
behaviors of management-controlled establishments.  Are owner-controlled firms seen as weaker 
competitors because of their lack of profit-seeking behavior such that management-controlled 
firms might seek them out as easy prey?  How might the lower responsiveness of owner-manager 
prices to market conditions affect the pricing strategies of management-controlled firms?  These 
are just a few of the questions that might extend this work to provide a richer view of the impact 
of owner-controlled firms on the nature of competition within a particular industry or market. 
Alternative Explanations 
We now consider potential alternative explanations for our findings.  First, one might 
argue that a key difference between owner-controlled and management-controlled firms is their 
access to resources and capabilities, and this difference might explain the variance in their  
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behaviors.  We do note that all of our results included a control to proxy for the resources and 
capabilities available to the firm. Obviously, this control is an imperfect proxy and while our data 
do not allow us to entirely rule out this alternative explanation, we do not believe that 
heterogeneity in access to financial resources or managerial capabilities accounts for the 
differences we observe in competitive behaviors for several reasons.  We first consider financial 
resources. If more economically attractive markets are more expensive to enter and management-
controlled firms have better access to financial resources, this could also explain the relationship 
we observe; however, the data do not appear to support this alternative.  First, as one rough 
measure of the cost of entry into different markets, we examined entry patterns into rural and 
metropolitan markets.  If resource differences constrain the entry ability of owner-controlled firms, 
we would expect to see much lower rates of owner-manager entry into metropolitan markets 
relative to the entry rates of management-controlled firms into these markets.  We found that 86.6 
percent of the management-controlled entries were into metropolitan markets while 81.7 percent 
of the owner-manager entries were into metropolitan markets.  While owner-managers do enter 
more costly metropolitan markets at lower rates, they still enter at very high rates and the 
difference between the two types of firms is not particularly large.  Second, and more importantly, 
financial resource differences would not provide an alternative explanation for the exit and pricing 
findings.  In particular, if owner-managers are more resource-constrained, we would expect to see 
their exit decisions be more responsive to the recent performance, not less responsive as we 
observed. 
  We also consider differences in managerial capabilities.   A concern may be that we 
observe weaker responsiveness to economic conditions from owner-controlled establishments 
because they are not sophisticated or knowledgeable enough to understand the correct response.   
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Knowledge differences might, for example, be associated with the fact that many of the 
management-controlled establishments are members of chain organizations, and the experiences 
of the organization can serve as a source of learning for all members of the chain (Baum and 
Ingram, 1998).  Again, we cannot rule this explanation out with the data we have available; 
however, we do argue that an alternative explanation relying on differences in knowledge or 
cognitive abilities is somewhat implausible in our context.  We specifically chose obvious 
measures of economic performance that are available to both owner-controlled and management-
controlled firms, and we believe it does not take a high level of knowledge or sophistication for 
any manager to understand that markets with higher occupancy levels provide more attractive 
economic conditions and that low unit occupancy rates are indicative of a struggling hotel.  
  Finally, we note that some might argue that management-controlled firms have different 
time horizons than do owner-controlled firms.  Management-controlled firms might be more 
focused on short-term results due to increased focus on short-term goals such as quarterly earnings 
in public firms, or even in private firms that closely monitor short-term performance targets.  In 
contrast, owner-controlled firms might be more likely to focus on the longer term, especially if the 
business is part of a legacy that will eventually be handed down to future generations.  This 
particular consideration might not affect our results for two reasons.  First, we can conceive an 
argument for the opposite perspective.  Owner-controlled firms, who may be liquidity constrained, 
may be forced to focus on the short-term in order to ensure sufficient capital to maintain 
operations.  Moreover, in the absence of a next generation to take over a business, owner-
managers who are looking to retire or otherwise exit from the business are unlikely to take a long-
term perspective.  Therefore, we do not believe it is clear ex ante which type of firm might be 
more focused on short-term results.  Second, it is unclear how a difference in time horizons might  
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account for our findings.  If we accept the argument that management-controlled firms are more 
interested in short-term results, how would this lead them to be more responsive to market 
conditions?  One would expect that being responsive to the economic attractiveness of the firm’s 
market would make sense regardless of a desire to maximize short- or long-term results. 
CONCLUSION 
The quest to understand heterogeneity in firm competitive behaviors is a fundamental 
research topic in competitive strategy research.  Although early work in this area assumed that 
firms were essentially homogenous in their makeup, more recent research has examined how 
variance in firm characteristics is related to competitive action heterogeneity.  We extend this 
research by considering the role of differences in ownership structure, a firm characteristic that has 
been demonstrated in other streams of management research to exert a powerful influence on firm 
actions.  Drawing from diverse literature streams, we offered competing hypotheses regarding the 
moderating influence of ownership structure on the competitive behaviors of owner-controlled and 
management-controlled firms, and our results demonstrated that the entry, exit, and pricing 
decisions of management-controlled establishments, in comparison with those of owner-controlled 
establishments, are more responsive to the underlying economic conditions of the markets in 
which they operate.  These results are consistent with the perspective that management-controlled 
firms are more likely than owner-controlled firms to be profit-seeking in our empirical context.  
Our study suggests that the quest to explain heterogeneity in competitive behaviors should 
consider how differences in ownership structure may influence heterogeneity in owner and 
manager objectives, which ultimately express themselves through differences in competitive 
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Capacity (Rooms) 121.30 66.09 55.21 **
Occupancy Rate (%) 59.15 50.60 8.55 **
Average Daily Rate (US $) 60.59 49.88 10.71 **
Segment (Ranges from 1-4) 1.87 1.55 0.32 **
# of Hotels Owned by Owner 15.22 1.04 14.17 **
% Franchise 40.60 38.63 1.97
% Company-Owned 35.88 0.00 35.88 **
% Independent 23.49 61.37 -37.88 **
n=1,490 n=1,799
Market-Level Averages
Capacity (Rooms) 531 418 113 **
Occupancy Rate (%) 54.79 52.07 2.72 **
Average Daily Rate (US $) 53.08 49.56 3.52 *
Segment (Ranges from 1-4) 1.61 1.52 0.09 *
Market Concentration (HHI) 0.46 0.51 -0.05 **
Population 22,941 20,214 2726.87 **
Household Income 20,675 18,882 1793.26 *
Number of Establishments 5.37 4.67 0.70 *
n=518 n=647
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01
Comparison as of period 17 (mid-point of data) 
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                                                   |
Market Occupany                                    0.020 *** 0.036 *** 0.034 *** | 0.021 *** 0.038 *** 0.035 ***
                                                   (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) | (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
Owner-Controlled * Market Occupancy -0.031 *** -0.029 *** | -0.032 *** -0.029 ***
                                                   (0.006) (0.006) | (0.006) (0.006)
Owner Capacity * Market Occupancy 0.007 | 0.009 +
                                                   (0.004) | (0.005)
Market Concentration                              -0.686 ** -0.719 *** -0.724 *** | -0.686 ** -0.720 *** -0.728 ***
                                                   (0.211) (0.211) (0.211) | (0.210) (0.210) (0.210)
Market Capacity                                    0.361 *** 0.357 *** 0.357 *** | 0.360 *** 0.356 *** 0.355 ***
                                                   (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) | (0.050) (0.050) (0.050)
Num. of Hotels of Same Chain                 -1.521 *** -1.527 *** -1.529 *** | -1.524 *** -1.529 *** -1.538 ***
                                                   (0.207) (0.207) (0.207) | (0.207) (0.207) (0.208)
Multi-Market Contact                               0.114 *** 0.103 ** 0.096 ** | 0.113 *** 0.102 ** 0.093 **
                                                   (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) | (0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
Rural                                              -0.155 -0.158 -0.159 | -0.090 -0.090 -0.090
                                                   (0.100) (0.100) (0.100) | (0.101) (0.101) (0.101)
Zip Code Retail Establishments                 0.122 + 0.122 + 0.123 + | 0.108 + 0.108 + 0.109 +
                                                   (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) | (0.063) (0.063) (0.063)
Zip Code Gas Establishments                    0.183 * 0.188 * 0.188 * | 0.221 ** 0.225 ** 0.225 **
                                                   (0.080) (0.080) (0.080) | (0.080) (0.080) (0.080)
Zip Code Housing Units                           0.392 *** 0.387 *** 0.386 *** | 0.437 *** 0.431 *** 0.429 ***
                                                   (0.115) (0.113) (0.113) | (0.119) (0.117) (0.117)
Zip Code Income                                    -0.339 *** -0.341 *** -0.342 *** | -0.366 *** -0.364 *** -0.363 ***
                                                   (0.090) (0.090) (0.090) | (0.091) (0.092) (0.092)
Zip Code Population                                -0.507 *** -0.502 *** -0.501 *** | -0.565 *** -0.558 *** -0.557 ***
                                                   (0.125) (0.124) (0.124) | (0.130) (0.128) (0.128)
Log-Likelihood                                     -5532.66 -5518.38 -5516.90 | -5298.27 -5283.48 -5281.47
Wald Chi-Squared                                   674.25 *** 687.63 *** 687.32 *** | 662.15 *** 676.51 *** 675.96 ***
Number of Entries                                  1,081 1,081 1,081 | 1,081 1,081 1,081
Average Alternatives per Entry                235 235 235 | 188 188 188
Number of Observations                          254,563 254,563 254,563 | 203,670 203,670 203,670
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Choice Set: 250 Closest Markets Choice Set: 200 Closest Markets










Prior Unit Occupany                                -0.062 *** -0.067 *** -0.067 *** | -0.058 *** -0.063 *** -0.063 ***
                                                   (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) | (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Owner-Controlled                                   -0.602 *** -1.116 *** -1.117 *** | -0.64 *** -1.136 *** -1.14 ***
                                                   (0.127) (0.275) (0.277) | (0.132) (0.267) (0.268)
Owner-Controlled * Prior Unit Occupancy            0.013 * 0.013 * | 0.013 * 0.013 *
                                                   (0.006) (0.006) | (0.006) (0.006)
Owner Capacity * Prior Unit Occupancy              0.000 | 0.000
                                                   (0.000) | (0.000)
Market Occupancy                                   0.025 *** 0.024 *** 0.024 *** | 0.039 *** 0.038 *** 0.038 ***
                                                   (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) | (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Market Concentration                               -0.774 * -0.751 + -0.75 + | -0.685 + -0.667 + -0.666 +
                                                   (0.386) (0.386) (0.386) | (0.395) (0.394) (0.395)
Market Capacity                                    -0.437 *** -0.427 *** -0.427 *** | -0.458 *** -0.449 *** -0.449 ***
                                                   (0.099) (0.100) (0.100) | (0.100) (0.101) (0.101)
Num. of Hotels of Same Chain                    0.571 0.575 0.575 | 0.576 0.577 0.576
                                                   (0.591) (0.595) (0.595) | (0.597) (0.601) (0.600)
Multi-Market Contact                               0.020 0.023 0.023 | 0.013 0.017 0.017
                                                   (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) | (0.050) (0.050) (0.050)
Rural                                              -0.454 ** -0.445 ** -0.445 ** | -0.429 ** -0.424 ** -0.424 **
                                                   (0.157) (0.156) (0.156) | (0.163) (0.162) (0.162)
Owner Capacity                                     -0.194 + -0.181 + -0.186 | -0.211 * -0.199 * -0.225
                                                   (0.102) (0.099) (0.141) | (0.104) (0.101) (0.140)
Midscale Segment                                   -0.415 ** -0.398 * -0.398 * | -0.462 ** -0.451 ** -0.451 **
                                                   (0.157) (0.158) (0.158) | (0.160) (0.160) (0.161)
Upscale Segment                                    -0.892 *** -0.853 ** -0.853 ** | -0.897 *** -0.862 ** -0.862 **
                                                   (0.264) (0.263) (0.263) | (0.271) (0.268) (0.268)
Luxury Segment                                     -0.898 ** -0.881 ** -0.881 ** | -0.917 ** -0.894 ** -0.895 **
                                                   (0.336) (0.335) (0.335) | (0.345) (0.345) (0.345)
Zip Code Retail Establishments                    -0.019 -0.022 -0.022 | -0.037 -0.04 -0.04
                                                   (0.130) (0.131) (0.131) | (0.135) (0.136) (0.136)
Zip Code Gas Establishments                       0.203 0.204 0.204 | 0.209 0.21 0.21
                                                   (0.153) (0.153) (0.153) | (0.155) (0.155) (0.155)
Zip Code Housing Units                             0.891 ** 0.888 *** 0.887 *** | 0.962 *** 0.958 *** 0.957 ***
                                                   (0.271) (0.265) (0.266) | (0.284) (0.278) (0.279)
Zip Code Income                                    0.092 0.103 0.103 | 0.051 0.063 0.064
                                                   (0.189) (0.189) (0.189) | (0.195) (0.195) (0.195)
Zip Code Population                                -0.898 *** -0.895 *** -0.894 *** | -0.975 *** -0.972 *** -0.971 ***
                                                   (0.227) (0.223) (0.224) | (0.234) (0.230) (0.230)
Constant                                           N/A N/A N/A | -1.817 -1.729 -1.728
                                                   | (2.254) (2.249) (2.249)
Log-Likelihood                                     -2295.36 -2293.23 -2293.23 | -1203.2 -1201.13 -1201.12
Wald Chi-Squared                                   376.538 *** 416.926 *** 418.596 *** | 344.096 *** 385.937 *** 388.955 ***
Number of Hotels                                   4,149 4,149 4,149 | 4,149 4,149 4,149
Number of Exits                                    306 306 306 | 306 306 306
Number of Observations                             105,037 105,037 105,037 | 105,037 105,037 105,037
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on market
Cox Proportional Hazard Models Weibull Models
Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
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Market Occupany 0.0021 *** 0.0025 *** 0.0022 ***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Owner-Controlled -0.0061 0.0307 ** 0.0154
(0.0048) (0.0111) (0.0115)
Owner-Controlled * Market Occupancy -0.0007 *** -0.0004 *
(0.0002) (0.0002)
Owner Capacity * Market Occupancy                  0.0000 ***
(0.0000)
Market Concentration -0.0098 -0.0102 -0.0095
(0.0208) (0.0208) (0.0208)
Market Capacity -0.0060 -0.0056 -0.0057
(0.0079) (0.0079) (0.0079)
Num. of Hotels of Same Chain                  -0.0259 + -0.0253 + -0.0251 +
                                                   (0.0149) (0.0150) (0.0150)
Multi-Market Contact                               -0.0017 * -0.0017 * -0.0015 *
                                                   (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0007)
Rural                                              -0.0318 ** -0.0315 ** -0.0313 **
(0.0114) (0.0114) (0.0114)
Owner Capacity -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 ***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Franchised Hotel 0.0674 *** 0.0675 *** 0.0677 ***
(0.0113) (0.0113) (0.0113)
Company-Owned Hotel 0.0784 *** 0.0778 *** 0.0792 ***
(0.0151) (0.0152) (0.0151)
Constant 3.6887 *** 3.6626 *** 3.6796 ***
(0.0539) (0.0539) (0.0539)
Fixed Establishment Effects YES YES YES
Fixed Segment Effects YES YES YES
Fixed Time Effects YES YES YES
Number of Observations 108,153 108,153 108,153
Number of Hotels                                   4,249 4,249 4,249
F-Value                                            109.920 *** 106.804 *** 105.748 ***
R-Sq-Between                                       0.5937 0.5919 0.594
R-Sq-Within                                        0.0614 0.0621 0.0634
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on unit

























Panel A – The Impact of Increasing Market Occupancy on Log Odds of Entry 
 
 
Note: figure created from results of Model 2 
 
 
Panel B – The Impact of Increasing Unit Occupancy on Probability of Exit within One Year 
 
 
Note: figure created from results of Model 9 
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